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Introduction
In preparing this report, the Committee has complied with
the Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations 2002, which introduced
new statutory requirements for the disclosure of directors’
remuneration in respect of periods ending on or after 31 December
2002. The report also meets the relevant requirements of the Listing
Rules of the Financial Services Authority and describes how the board
has applied the Principles of Good Governance relating to directors’
remuneration. As in the previous year, a resolution to approve the
report will be proposed at the forthcoming Annual General Meeting
of the Company.
The Regulations require the auditors to report to the Company’s
members on the “auditable part” of the remuneration report
and to state whether, in their opinion, that part of the report has
been properly prepared in accordance with the Companies Act 1985 (as
amended by the Regulations). The report has therefore been divided
into separate sections for unaudited and audited information. Within
the unaudited section, the report deals with
the remuneration policy that is to be followed in respect of 2003,
summarises the results of a remuneration survey which was undertaken
during the year and describes arrangements which applied during 2002.
Remuneration Committee
The Company has established a Remuneration Committee
(“the Committee”) in accordance with the recommendations
of the Combined Code. The names of members of the Committee during
the year and, where there has been a change during the year, their
date of appointment or retirement, are given below: |
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Director |
Appointment date |
Retirement date |
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Dr K Bond |
|
9 May 2002 |
E G F Brown |
13 December 2001 |
|
K F Payne |
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Dr H Peipers |
|
9 May 2002 |
R T Scholes |
7 February 2002 |
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Mr Brown took over as Chairman of the Committee,
following
Dr Bond’s retirement in May.
The principal function of the Committee is to agree with the board
the framework and policy for the remuneration of the Group’s
executive management and to determine, on behalf of the board, the
remuneration packages of the executive directors.
No member of the Committee has any personal financial interest (other
than as a shareholder), conflict of interest arising from cross-directorships
or day-to-day involvement in running the business. No director plays
a part in any discussion about his own remuneration. As discussed
in the Corporate governance,
the board considers Mr Brown, Mr Payne and Mr Scholes to be independent
directors.
In determining the directors’ remuneration for the year, the
Committee consulted Dr West, the chairman and Mr Dobson, the chief
executive about its proposals except in relation to their own remuneration.
The Committee also appointed MCG Consulting to advise on the remuneration
survey. In January 2003, New Bridge Street Consultants were appointed
by the board to advise on long-term incentive arrangements, which
are discussed below. Neither of these firms has provided any other
services to the Group. However, MCG’s parent, DLA, is the Company’s
legal adviser. Remuneration
policy and arrangements
The objective of the remuneration policy is to ensure that members
of the executive management of the Company are provided with appropriate
incentives to encourage enhanced performance and are, in a fair and
responsible manner, rewarded for their individual contributions to
the success of the Company. Each director is assessed individually
so that his remuneration is directly related to his performance over
time and so that a significant proportion of his remuneration package
is performance related.
During the year, a review of executive remuneration was undertaken
on behalf of the Committee, comparing all elements of remuneration
against over 30 comparator businesses, having regard to size, profitability
and geographic spread. The review was undertaken by the company secretary
under the guidance of MCG Consulting, which advised on the scope and
methodology of the survey, sense checked the data against its own
data sources and provided an independent challenge to the analysis
and conclusions.
The survey showed that, in the 2001 calendar year
(the period under review), the Company’s earnings per share
(EPS) growth was in the market upper quartile, whilst total remuneration
levels including pension (but excluding any share based emoluments)
were found to be below the market median.
The survey reviewed the Company’s long term incentive arrangements
against the comparator groups. Notwithstanding the difficulty in quantifying
the value of awards under share-based, long term incentive schemes,
as market values fluctuate, the analysis did indicate that the Company
was somewhat behind the market in terms of the number of shares over
which options were granted and the value of options granted as a percentage
of salary.
In light of the findings of the remuneration survey, the Committee
has agreed the principle that base salary should be set broadly in
line with the median for executives who have sustained performance
in a role of comparable standing and that directors should be able
to achieve total remuneration at the market upper quartile level when
justified by performance.
There are five main elements of the remuneration
package for executive directors and senior managers: basic
salary, performance related annual bonus, long term incentive arrangements,
pension arrangements and other benefits: (i) Basic salary
An executive director’s basic salary is determined by the Committee
before the start of each year and when an individual changes position
or responsibility. In deciding appropriate levels, the Committee considers
the Group as a whole and seeks to be competitive, but fair, using
information provided both by external and internal sources. As noted
above, the Committee has agreed the principle that base salary should
be set broadly in line with the market median. (ii) Performance
related annual bonus
Performance related annual cash bonuses are designed to reward contribution
and to encourage the achievement of targeted levels of performance
over the short term.
The maximum annual cash bonuses are set by the Committee and are subject
to stretching targets linked to the Group’s operating performance
in the year and to individual performance against objectives set by
the Committee.
The performance related bonus is not pensionable.
Following the remuneration survey, it was decided that the maximum
bonus potential be increased to 50% of basic
annual salary from 1 January 2003. This is consistent with
the market median maximum bonus. (iii) Long term incentive
arrangements
The Company’s long term incentive arrangements are intended
to encourage directors and other key employees to focus on long term,
strategic corporate objectives and to further align the interests
of management and shareholders. They consist of share option arrangements
and a deferred annual bonus scheme, further details of which can be
found below.
Since the end of the year, the Committee has initiated
a review of long term incentive arrangements. The review is ongoing
and the Committee has not yet determined to what
extent it may result in a change in the policy relating to long term
incentive arrangements. |
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Share option arrangements
Since 2001, the Group has operated an Inland Revenue approved executive
share option plan (“the Approved Plan”) and an unapproved
share option plan (“the Unapproved Plan”).
Under the Approved Plan, the total market value of shares at the
date of grant over which any participant may be awarded options
is £30,000. At any time, the total number of new issue shares
over which options may be granted (under all share option plans
of the Company) in any consecutive ten-year period must not exceed
10% of the issued ordinary share capital.
Under the plans, options are being granted annually.
The rules of the plans provide that, except in exceptional circumstances,
in any 12-month period, a participant may not be granted options
over shares (under all share option plans of the Company) having
a market value in excess of his or her gross remuneration (excluding
bonuses and benefits in kind) in that 12-month period. In exceptional
circumstances, such as the need to recruit a key executive, this
individual limit may be exceeded. The limit was exceeded in respect
of options granted to Mr Dobson, Mr Atkinson and Mr Ewen in 2002,
following a steep increase in the share price between the date of
approving the options and the date of granting the options.
Options granted under the plans are only exercisable when the Company
has achieved average annual growth in adjusted EPS of not less than
4% above the increase in the retail price index over at least three
consecutive years from the date of grant. Adjusted EPS is calculated
before the amortisation of goodwill. There is flexibility to “re-test”
the performance condition at the end of the fourth year if the condition
is not met over the initial three year period following grant. If
the performance condition is not achieved by the end of the fourth
year, the option will lapse. The Committee selected EPS for the
performance condition because it provides participants with the
incentive to increase earnings, a key indicator of the underlying
financial performance of the Company.
The Approved and Unapproved Plans were introduced
in 2001 to replace an Inland Revenue approved executive share option
scheme which was established in 1994 and which by 2001 no longer
reflected best practice (“the 1994 Scheme”). No new
options have been granted under the 1994 Scheme since 1995 and it
is the intention that no new options will be granted under this
scheme in the future.
Deferred Annual Bonus Scheme
The Keller Group plc Deferred Annual Bonus Scheme (“the DABS
Scheme”), a long term incentive plan for the executive directors
and a limited number of senior employees, was adopted in 1998 and
terminated on 21 June 2000 in accordance with its rules. No further
awards will be granted under the DABS Scheme but the provisions
of the DABS Scheme remain in force with regard to awards that have
already been granted.
The operation of the DABS Scheme was subject to the discretion of
the board. Participants in the DABS Scheme were required to defer
50% of their performance related annual bonus in the form of shares
in the Company for a period of three years. At the end of the three-year
deferral period, matched shares could be awarded up to a maximum
of two matched shares for every one share deferred, depending on
a combination of performance requirements. These are annual growth
in adjusted EPS and the Total Shareholder Return (TSR) performance
of the Group against a group of construction industry comparator
companies.
Once the matched shares have unconditionally vested, participants
have the option of selling their shares or earning additional matched
shares at the rate of one for every five shares retained for a further
two-year period.
No award of shares, matched shares or additional matched shares
form part of a participant’s pensionable salary.
Details of the shares awarded are shown on page 34 under directors’
interests in long term incentive plans.
(iv) Pension arrangements
Mr Atkinson and Dr West are both members of the Keller Group Pension
Scheme. This scheme provides a lump sum death in service benefit
and pensions for dependants on death in service or following retirement.
On retirement at age 62, Mr Atkinson will be eligible for a pension
based upon a percentage of final salary. This percentage will increase
with pensionable service to a maximum of two-thirds, subject to
Inland Revenue limits. Mr Dobson is a member of a defined contribution
scheme operated in the US. His normal retirement age is 65.
(v) Other benefits
Other benefits for executive directors comprise a car and payment
of its operating expenses and fuel, entitlement to a private health
care scheme and pensions as detailed above. In addition, the Company
pays the accommodation costs in the UK for Mr Dobson, whose main
home is in the US.
Service contracts
In accordance with general market practice, it is the Company’s
policy that executive directors should have contracts with an indefinite
term providing for a maximum of one year’s notice. However,
it may be necessary occasionally to offer longer initial notice
periods to attract new directors, provided that the notice period
shall reduce to one year after the initial period.
Mr Dobson has a service agreement dated 10 April 1995, which is
terminable on one year’s notice by either party. Mr Atkinson
has a service agreement dated 11 October 1999, which is terminable
on one year’s notice by either party. In the event of early
termination, the directors’ contracts provide for compensation
up to a maximum of basic salary plus the fair value of benefits
to which the directors are contractually entitled for the unexpired
portion of the notice period. The Company seeks to apply the principle
of mitigation in the payment of compensation on the termination
of the service agreement of any executive director.
During the year, £35,000 was paid to Mr K Kirsch and £30,000
was paid to Mr M W C Martin, both former directors of the Company,
for consultancy services provided to Group companies.
The board may allow executive directors to accept external appointments,
provided that the Company retains any related remuneration.
Non-executive directors
All non-executive directors have specific terms of engagement, the
dates of which are set out below, with an initial appointment period
of 12 months and thereafter subject to three months’ notice
by either party. There are no provisions for compensation payable
in the event of early termination.
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Director |
Date of engagement letter |
|
Dr K Bond (retired 9 May 2002) |
11 June 1999 |
E G F Brown |
18 January 2002 |
P J Lopez Jimenez |
21 January 2003 |
K F Payne |
11 June 1999 |
Dr H Peipers (retired 9 May 2002) |
21 March 1995 |
R T Scholes |
8 February 2002 |
Dr J M West |
8 June 1998 |
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The determination of the non-executive directors’
remuneration has been delegated by the board to the executive directors,
within the limits set by the Articles of Association and based on
independent surveys of fees paid to non-executive directors of similar
companies. The fees paid to non-executive directors in the year, shown
below, are inclusive of the additional work performed for the Company
in respect of membership of the board committees. Non-executive directors
cannot participate in any of the Company’s long term incentive
arrangements. |
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Relative
performance
The following graph shows the Company’s performance, measured
by TSR, compared with the performance of the FTSE All-Share Index.
This index has been selected because it reflects the Company’s
international nature better than the UK Construction & Building
Materials index, the constituents of which operate predominantly in
the UK, and because it reflects the Company’s size better than
the FTSE 100 or the FTSE 250 indices. |
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Audited information |
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Directors’ emoluments for
the year ended 31 December 2002 |
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Basic
salary
2002 £000 |
Fees
2001 £000 |
Benefits
2002 £000 |
Annual
bonus
2002 £000 |
Total
emoluments
2002 £000 |
Total
emoluments
2001 £000 |
|
Executive |
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|
J R Atkinson |
|
|
150 |
- |
14 |
45 |
209 |
180 |
T Dobson |
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|
240 |
- |
50 |
72 |
362 |
375 |
Non-executive |
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Dr K Bond |
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|
- |
8 |
- |
- |
8 |
20 |
E G F Brown |
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|
- |
23 |
- |
- |
23 |
- |
K F Payne |
|
|
- |
23 |
- |
- |
23 |
20 |
H Peipers |
|
|
- |
8 |
- |
- |
8 |
20 |
R T Scholes |
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|
- |
21 |
- |
- |
21 |
- |
Dr J M West |
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|
- |
67 |
15 |
- |
82 |
81 |
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390 |
150 |
79 |
117 |
736 |
696 |
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Included in the above were fees amounting to £23,000
paid to G. Brown Associates Limited in respect of services provided
by Mr Brown.
A maximum annual cash bonus of 40% of basic annual salary was set
for the year ended 31 December 2002, of which up to 25% of salary
related to the achievement of profit related targets, split equally
between profit before tax (PBT) and EPS, and up to 15% related to
the achievement of individual objectives. The baselines for the 2002
operating performance targets, below which no bonus was payable, were
set at PBT of £25m and EPS of 25p. The performance targets attracting
maximum bonus are considered commercially sensitive and are not, therefore,
disclosed. |
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Directors’ shareholdings
The directors’ beneficial interests in the issued ordinary share
capital of the Company were: |
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At
31 December
2002
Ordinary
shares |
At
31 December
2001
Ordinary
shares |
|
J R Atkinson |
28,315 |
24,134 |
T Dobson |
919,571 |
898,000 |
K Payne |
8,588 |
3,808 |
Dr J M West |
1,948,000 |
1,948,000 |
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There have been no changes in the directors’ beneficial
interests during the period from the end of the financial year to
6 March 2003.
Any ordinary shares required to fulfil entitlements under the DABS
Scheme are provided by the Keller Group plc Employee Benefit Trust
(the Trust). As beneficiaries under the Trust, the directors are deemed
to be interested in the shares held by the Trust which, at 31 December
2002, amounted to 195,044 ordinary shares. |
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Directors’ pension
rights
Dr West, having retired in 1997, received a pension of £134,000
in 2002. Company pension contributions in 2002 to the US defined contribution
scheme in respect of Mr Dobson were £7,200 (2001: £12,200).
The change during the year in the accrued pension entitlement of Mr
Atkinson under the Keller Group Pension Scheme is shown in the table
below: |
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Director |
|
Transfer
value of
accrued
benefit
at begining
of year £000 |
Transfer
value of
accrued
benefit
at end
of year
£000 |
Increase
in transfer
value during
the year
less member
contributions
£000 |
Accrued
pension at
end of year
£000 |
Increase
in accrued
pension
including
inflation £000 |
Increase
in accrued
pension
excluding
inflation
£000 |
Transfer
value of
increase
in accrued
pension
excluding
inflation less
member
contribution
£000 |
|
J R Atkinson |
|
150 |
155 |
4 |
36 |
11 |
10 |
43 |
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The total accrued pension entitlement shown is that
which would be paid annually on retirement, based on service to the
end of the year. |
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Directors’ interests
in long term incentive plans
The directors’ interests in the Deferred Annual Bonus Scheme
are given in the table below: |
|
Name of Director |
|
|
Interests as
at 1 January 2002 |
Awards granted
during the year |
Market value
of shares when award granted |
Awards lapsed
or crystallised
during the year |
Increased as
at
31 December
2002 |
Crystallising
dates of
outstanding
awards |
|
J R Atkinson |
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|
11,557 |
1,409 |
333.5p |
7,043 |
5,923 |
09/03/03 |
T Dobson |
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|
30,310 |
4,314 |
333.5p |
21,571 |
13,053 |
09/03/03 |
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The following table provides further information in
relation to the awards previously granted under the Deferred Annual
Bonus Scheme that were subject to the performance conditions described
above and which crystallised during the year: |
|
Name of Director |
|
|
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|
Date of award |
Number
of shares
vesting |
Market price
of shares when
award granted |
Market price
of shares
on vesting |
|
J R Atkinson |
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|
11/03/99 |
5,634 |
238.5p |
333.5p |
T Dobson |
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11/03/99 |
17,258 |
238.5p |
333.5p |
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As mentioned above, the Deferred Annual Bonus Scheme
was terminated on 21 June 2000. No awards of deferred shares were
therefore made in relation to the year ended 31 December 2002. The
performance conditions applying to all of the above awards are described
more fully above. |
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Share options |
|
Name of Director |
Options
held at
1 January 2002 |
Options
granted
during
the year |
Options
exercised
during
the year |
Options
lapsed
during
the year |
Options
held at
31 December 2002 |
Exercise price |
Dates
from which
exercisable |
Expiry date |
|
J R Atkinson |
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|
1994 Scheme* |
14,800 |
- |
6,100 |
- |
8,700 |
102.0p |
26/04/98 |
25/04/05 |
Unapproved Plan |
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14 May 2001 |
25,000 |
- |
- |
- |
25,000 |
231.5p |
14/05/04 |
13/05/11 |
13 March 2002 |
- |
45,511 |
- |
- |
45,511 |
332.0p |
13/03/05 |
12/03/12 |
Approved Plan |
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13 March 2002 |
- |
4,489 |
- |
- |
4,489 |
332.0p |
13/03/05 |
12/03/12 |
|
T Dobson |
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1994 Scheme* |
80,000 |
- |
- |
- |
80,000 |
102.0p |
26/04/98 |
25/04/05 |
Unapproved Plan |
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14 May 2001 |
50,000 |
- |
- |
- |
50,000 |
231.5p |
14/05/04 |
13/05/11 |
13 March 2002 |
- |
75,000 |
- |
- |
75,000 |
332.0p |
13/03/05 |
12/03/12 |
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169,800 |
125,000 |
6,100 |
- |
288,700 |
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*All share options granted under the 1994 Scheme were
granted on 26 April 1995.
The market value of the shares at 31 December 2002 was 250p and the
range during the year was 228.5p to 367p. The market value of the
shares on 25 April 2002, when Mr Atkinson exercised his option, was
360p, producing a gain on exercise of £15,738.
The performance conditions applying to the above options are described
more fully above. There have been no variations to the terms and conditions
or performance criteria for share options during the financial year.
On behalf of the board
E G F Brown Chairman,
Remuneration Committee
6 March 2003 |
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